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Apples and Oranges-The Supremacy
Clause and the Determination of Self-
Executing Treaties: A Response to
Professor Vazquez
By KHALDOUN A. BAGHDADI*
I. Introduction
The doctrine of self-executing treaties is currently in a state of
disarray.' Both courts and scholars have essentially "missed the boat"
in attempting to determine whether or not a specific treaty provision
is self-executing.2 In his recent article entitled The Four Doctrines of
Self-Executing Treaties,3 Professor Carlos Manuel Vazquez attempts to
ease some of the confusion surrounding the determination of whether
or not a treaty provision is self-executing.4 In assessing whether or
not a specific treaty provision is self-executing, Professor Vazquez's
analysis rests on the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion.5 Respectfully, Professor Vazquez's focus on the Supremacy
Clause in making this analysis is essentially misplaced. Simply stated,
the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution has nothing to do with
whether or not a treaty provision is self-executing. Rather, the
* Member of the Class of 1997. B.A. cwn laude, University of California, Irvine,
1994. The author wishes to thank Abed and Samira Baghdadi. Also. the author wishes to
stress that this Comment is for, and is made possible because of, Professor Stefan
Riesenfeld.
1. See Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and U.S. v. Pos-
tab" Win at Any Price? 74 Am. J. b1"L L. S92 (19S0).
2. See id. at 895.
3. Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, S9 Am. J.
INr'L L. 695 (1995).
4. Id. at 695.
5. Id. at 696. The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution mandates that:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pur-
suance thereof, and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Author-
ity of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State notwithstanding.
U.S. CoNsr. art. VI, § 2.
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Supremacy Clause serves to ensure that federal law prevails over state
law.6 The issue of whether a treaty entered into by the United States
will override a conflicting codified state law, and potentially even a
state policy, has been well settled by the courts.7 Moreover, there is
no indication that a non-self-executing treaty provision will not also
trump a state law or policy.8 As such, a Supremacy Clause analysis is
immaterial to the determination of whether or not a particular treaty
provision is self-executing.
One may ask why the distinction between self-executing and non-
self-executing treaties is so important. As the United States is cur-
rently on the road to ratifying the Third United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III),' courts will inevitably be faced
with the issue of whether specific provisions of UNCLOS III are self-
executing. Looking towards the Supremacy Clause simply does not
assist in that determination. Rather, incorporating the Supremacy
Clause into the determination of the self-executive nature of a treaty
adds to what is already a dysfunctional family of literature and case
law.1
0
This Comment shall first provide a brief overview of the doctrine
of self-executing treaties in international law. A more detailed discus-
sion of Professor Vazquez's article as it relates to the Supremacy
Clause will follow. In essence, there are three basic criticisms to Vaz-
quez's analysis. First, Vazquez mistakenly assumes that the
Supremacy Clause addresses the issue of self-executing treaties. Sec-
6. U.S. CONST. art. VI; see also Riesenfeld, supra note 1, at 900-01. Riesenfeld
stressed that:
A treaty provision which by its terms and purpose is meant to stipuk te the imme-
diate and not merely progressive creation of rights, privileges, duties, and immu-
nities cognizable in domestic courts and is capable of being applied by the courts
without further concretization is self-executing by virtue of the constitutional
mandate of Article VI of the U.S. Constitution.
Id.
7. See, e.g, Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 190 (1961); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3
Dallas) 199, 236 (1795) (holding that in order for a treaty to be the Supreme law of the
land, no state legislation can "stand in its way").
8. See Kolovrat, 366 U.S. at 190. Justice Black gave no indication that the self-execut-
ing or non-self-executing nature of the treaty between Serbia and the United States had
any bearing on whether or not it overrode the Oregon state policy in question. Id.
9. Third United Nations Convention on the Law of The Sea, opened for signature
Dec. 10, 1982, 11th Sess., 183d-193d mtg. at 164, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122, reprinted in 21
I.L.M. 1261.
10. See, e.g., Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1932); Yuji Iwasawa, The Doctrine




ond, even if the Framers did envision that the doctrine of self-execut-
ing treaties should be used as a tool for ensuring federal supremacy,
there is no evidence of this in the Supremacy Clause, or anywhere else
in the Constitution. Third, even if evidence did exist that the Foun-
ders sought to ensure federal supremacy through the doctrine of self-
executing treaties, there is no reason why they would want to. This
Comment will illustrate that Professor Vazquez's incorporation of the
Supremacy Clause into the analysis of the self-executing nature of
treaty provisions is unnecessary and erroneous.11 A treaty provision
can, and should, be assessed in terms of its self-executive nature with-
out any reference to the Supremacy Clause. Professor Vazquez's im-
port of yet another level of analysis to this already confusing field is
therefore troublesome.
H. Sef-Executing Treaties in International Law
A self-executing treaty is one that confers specific rights upon in-
dividuals that are enforceable in domestic courts in a state, without
the need for specific enabling legislation.U2 As stated rather succinctly
by Professor Riesenfeld: "Nevertheless, as a matter of precedent and
practice the term self-executing should not be reserved to dispositive
treaties but rather to international agreements that are meant, and are
specific enough to be able, to establish rights and duties of individuals
directly enforceable in domestic courts.
13
Amidst the massive amounts of literature addressing the doctrine
of self-executing treaties, no consensus exists as to the origins of the
doctrine. 4 Moreover, reasonable courts differ as to what constitutes a
self-executing treaty.15 Although some scholars consider the doctrine
11. This is not to say that the Supremacy Clause has nothing to do ith treaties.
Rather, the Supremacy Clause is simply irrelevant to the determination of whether a treaty
entered into by the United States is self-executing.
12. Individuals can therefore seek enforcement of the treaty in court, without the aid
of a domestic statute. See Riesenfeld, supra note 1, at S95-96; United States v. Postal, 5S9
F.2d 862,875 (5th Cir. 1979); Cook, 28S U.S. at 119; Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pat.) 253.
314 (1829), overruled by United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, S9 (1833)
(Percheman overruled Foster, but preserved the definition of a self-executing treaty proli-
sion for the purposes of U.S. law).
13. Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Restatement International Agreements, 14 YALE J. IN'r L L
455, 463 (1989).
14. Compare Riesenfeld, supra note 1, with Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 2
Am. J. T-'L L. 760 (1988).
15. In determining whether or not a treaty provision is self-executing, courts %ill usu-
ally pay deference to a determination by the U.S. Department of State. See Caltagirone v.
Grant, 629 F.2d 739, 746 n.18 (2d Cir. 19S0).
1997]
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to be an American addition to international law, 16 examples of a
treaty affording rights to individuals within the state can be observed
as far back as the Treaties of Westphalia. 17 Moreover, although the
notion that a treaty can afford rights to individuals without the need
for enabling legislation seems clear enough, interpretation of whether
or not a treaty provision is self-executing has led to troublesome and
conflicting results.'
An example of such a result can be found in United States v. Pos-
tal.19 In Postal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Article 6
of the Convention on the High Seas20 was not self-exec'ating.2t In so
holding, the court relied primarily on the "intent test,"'' 2 despite the
fact that the intent of the parties to a treaty is not dispositive in the
determination of whether a specific treaty provision is self-
executing.
23
To the contrary, the intent of the parties to a treaty applies "only
to the question whether private individuals shall have the right of pro-
tection in domestic courts against violations of a treaty provision.
'2 4
Moreover, the means by which this protection is to be afforded is a
matter of "constitutional law and not within the purview of the intent
either of all the parties to the treaty or of a particular ratifying
power. '25 As such, deciding whether the United States intended a
treaty provision to be self-executing when it was ratified does not end
the inquiry.26 Other factors must be taken into account, including the
16. See MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION To INTERNATIONAL LAW 85 (1993).
17. See Treaty of Westphalia, Jan. 11, 1649, Fr.-Holy Roman Empire, art. VI, 1 Con.
T.S. 319. For a thorough discussion of the doctrine of self-executing treaties in other coun-
tries, see Riesenfeld, supra note 1, at 896 ("The doctrine of self-executing treaties is rele-
vant not only in the law of the United States but also in many other legal :;ystems, including
that of the Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, Switzerland, the European Communi-
ties and, since the reform of the preliminary title to the Civil Code, Spain.") Id. (citations
omitted).
18. See Riesenfeld, supra note 1, at 896 ("From the survey of the copious literature it
emerges that the doctrine of self-executing treaties is in need of clarification.").
19. 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1979).
20. Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312,450 U.N.T.S. 82. For
a more detailed discussion of the Fifth Circuit's decision, see generally Riesenfeld, supra
note 1.
21. Postal, 589 F.2d at 884.
22. Id. ("In sum, we do not believe that the United States intended to limit its tradi-
tionally asserted jurisdiction over foreign vessels on the high seas by adopting Article 6 of
the High Seas Convention.").
23. See Riesenfeld, supra note 1, at 895-96.
24. Id.




language of the treaty itself.27 As such, the Fifth Circuit relied too
heavily on the intent of the signatories in determining self-execution.
Despite some troubling results, not every instance involving the
determination of whether a treaty provision is self-executing results in




the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals set forth a workable set of criteria
for determining whether or not a treaty provision was self-executing. -' 9
The Saipan court was faced with the determination of whether the
Trusteeship Agreement for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
(Micronesia) was self-executing.30 The court held that the Trusteeship
Agreement was self-executing in that it afforded rights and duties to
individuals that were specifically enforceable.31 In so holding, the
court adopted a contextual analysis for the determination of self-exe-
cution, without focusing solely on the intent of the signatories.
The extent to which an international agreement establishes affirma-
tive and judicially enforceable obligations without implementing
legislation must be determined in each case by reference to many
contextual factors: the purposes of the treaty and the objectives of
its creators, the existence of domestic procedures and institutions
appropriate for direct implementation, the availability and feasibil-
ity of alternative enforcement methods, and the immediate and
long-range social consequences of self-execution and non-self-
execution.
32
Thus, in Saipan, the Ninth Circuit was able to formulate an ac-
ceptable set of criteria for the determination of whether a treaty was
self-executing without any reference to the Supremacy Clause.3
However, Professor Vazquez does not share this author's support for
the analysis of the Saipan court.34 Specifically, Vazquez characterized
the Saipan test to "resemble the ad hoc, quasi-discretionary absten-
27. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child is an example of a
treaty that contains provisions that specifically mandate non.self-esecution. Conventon
on the Rights of the Child, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Do:. A/44736
(1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1448.
28. 502 F.2d 90, 97 (9th Cir. 1974).
29. Id. at 97.
30. Id. at 96.
31. Id. at 97-98.
32. Id. at 97 (citing MYXREs S. McDOUGAL. ET Ai.., THE I, U RPRETATION or AGRE-.
MENTS AND WORLD PUBLC ORDER; PRICIPLES OF CoNrrNr AND PROcr.E passin
(1967)).
33. Id.
34. See Vazquez, supra note 3, at 714.
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tion doctrine that some consider the political question doctrine to
be. ' 35 Professor Vazquez goes further to claim that:
Like this understanding of the political question doctrine, this ver-
sion of the self-execution doctrine can be criticized as incompatible
with our society's conceptions about what it means for a norm to
have the status of "law," and, in particular, about the judiciary's role
in enforcing the norms of such status.
36
Thus, according to Vazquez, the main problem with the Saipan
case appears to be the courts' lack of emphasis on the Supremacy
Clause. However, it is this authors' contention that the reasoning of
Saipan is completely sound, because of the exact same reason. The
text of the Supremacy Clause would give the Ninth Circuit absolutely
no guidance in determining whether the Trusteeship agreement provi-
sion was indeed self-executing. In sum, the fact that the Ninth Circuit
did not turn to the text of the Supremacy Clause does not transform
the court's application of the doctrine into "an ad hoe, quasi-absten-
tion doctrine.
'37
When international treaties are concerned, the Supremacy Clause
operates solely to incorporate them as a part of federal law.38 As
such, determining whether something is in fact a treaty should essen-
tially be the extent of the Supremacy Clause analysis on this issue.
Apart from that initial inquiry, the Supremacy Clause simply does not
assist courts or scholars in the determination of whether a treaty pro-
vision is indeed self-executing.
m. The Supremacy Clause and the Determination of Self-
Executing Treaties
Professor Vazquez characterizes the Supremacy Clause as a cen-
tral factor in the determination of whether or not a treaty provision is
self-executing.39 There are three major problems with this analysis.
First, it assumes that the Supremacy Clause addresses the issue of self-
executing treaties. Second, even if the Framers did envision the doc-




38. In turn, the Supremacy Clause makes treaties supreme over state law, without any
mention of whether or not the treaty in question is self-executing. See U.S. CONST. art. VI.
39. See, e.g., Vazquez, supra note 3, at 699 (suggesting that the main means by which




supremacy, there is no evidence in the Supremacy Clause, or any-
where else in the Constitution, that this was the case. Third, even if
evidence did exist that the Founders wanted to ensure federal
supremacy through the doctrine of self-executing treaties, there is no
reason why the Framers would want to.
The first criticism of Vazquez's assertion is based on a plain
meaning interpretation of the Constitution. Though the Supremacy
Clause on its face does ensure that treaties are to be supreme against
state law,' it does not mandate that only self-executing treaties are
supreme, nor does it mandate that non-self-executing treaties are not.
Simply put, the validity of a treaty determines whether it is supreme
over state law, irrespective of the whether certain provisions of the
treaty are indeed self-executing. 41 Despite this, Vazquez characterizes
the Supremacy Clause as a constitutional provision that specifically
deals with the issue of self-executing treaties, claiming that it "ad-
dressed the treaty violations problem by altering the British rule: it
declared treaties to be the 'the Supreme Law of the Land' and di-
rected the courts to give them effect without awaiting action by the legis-
latures of either the states or the federal government."'I This
characterization imports the doctrine of self-executing treaties into an
area of the law where it simply does not exist. The text of the
Supremacy Clause mandates that treaties are to be supreme over state
laws, and nothing more. Nonetheless, Professor Vazquez asserts that:
The Supremacy Clause does not eliminate every possible obstacle a
litigant relying on a treaty might face, but it does eliminate one:
without the clause, the nation's treaties would merely have pos-
sessed the status of international law enforceable only by states and
only in international fora; the Supremacy Clause gives treaties the
character of municipal law enforceable in domestic courts at the be-
hest of private individuals.
4 3
Again, there is no mention of the doctrine of self-executing trea-
ties in the Supremacy Clause. It is simply false to claim otherwise.
Had the Framers of the Constitution intended that the Supremacy
Clause operate through the doctrine of self-executing treaties, they
would have drafted the clause accordingly. Otherwise, the Supremacy
Clause, as well as the Constitution, are silent on this issue.
40. See U.S. CoNsT. art. VI.
41. Of course, it is possible that a treaty may be invalid for a number of reasons, and in
turn affect its supremacy over state law. Cf. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall) 199 (1796).
42. Vazquez, supra note 3, at 699 (emphasis added).
43. Id. (citations omitted).
1997]
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Due to the fact that the Supremacy Clause is silent on the doc-
trine, the self-executing nature of a treaty should not affect the prior-
ity of the treaty in terms of its authoritative rank in the U.S.
constitutional hierarchy.' An example of this principle may be found
in Kolovrat v. Oregon,5 where the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed an
Oregon state policy that conflicted with an 1881 Treaty of Friendship
between the United States and Serbia.46 The Court held that the Ore-
gon state policy was subordinate to the treaty, due to the fact that the
treaty was a part of the federal law.47
The issue of whether the Treaty of Friendship was self-executing
was wholly immaterial to the holding of the Kolovrat Court, as evi-
denced by the fact that it was not even mentioned.4 8 Thus, if a state
policy must yield to a treaty, there cannot be serious doubt that the
Supremacy Clause would not also mandate the same result in a case
where the treaty was self-executing.4 9 In sum, the Supremacy Clause
makes no mention of self-execution, and operates irrespective of the
self-executing nature of a treaty provision.
The second criticism of Vazquez's assertion involves the Framer's
intent. There is ample evidence that the Framers of the Constitution
were concerned with federal law being supreme over state law,5 0
Moreover, the plain language of the Supremacy Clause indicates an
intent on the part of the Framers to include treaties as a part of the
44. See, e.g., Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 197 (1961); Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448,
453-544 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that the Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the
Organization of American States (Protocol of Buenos Aires), Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607,
721 U.N.T.S. 324 was not self-executing). The Plyler court's determination of whether the
Protocol was self-executing was not based upon the wholly separate and distinct determi-
nation of whether the Protocol was supreme over the Texas statute. See a so United States
v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655,667 (1992) ("The Extradition Treaty ha: the force oflaw,
and if, as respondent asserts, it is self-executing, it would appear that a court must enforce
it on behalf of an individual regardless of the offensiveness of the practice of one nation to
the other nation." (emphasis added)). As such, the Court's language in Alvarez-Machain
conveys the notion that the force of the treaty does not depend upon whether or not the
treaty is self-executing.
45. 366 U.S. 187 (1961).
46. Id. at 190.
47. Id. at 198.
48. See generally id.
49. Id.
50. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 226-27 (2d. ed. 1988),
"Under the supremacy clause, it is indisputable that a valid treaty overrides any conflicting
state law, even on matters otherwise within state control." Id. (citing Ware v. Hylton, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796)). It should follow that whether or not the treaty is self-executing
does not affect its supremacy.
[Vol. 20:701
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federal law, thus allowing them to trump state law.51 Even if the
Framers were concerned over treaty violations on the part of the
states, placing treaties within the ambit of federal law would certainly
remedy this problem.52 However, the notion that self-executing trea-
ties was somehow imported into this rationale, as a vehicle for ensur-
ing federal supremacy, is simply counterintuitive. Vazquez notes:
The history of the Supremacy Clause thus shows that its purpose
was to avert violations of treaties attributable to the United States,
and that the Founders sought to accomplish this goal by making trea-
ties enforceable in the courts at the behest of affected individuals
without the need for additional legislative action, either state or
federal
53
In the above passage, the first characterization of the purpose of
the Supremacy Clause is settled law. However, it is the second con-
tention that is troublesome. There is no evidence that the Framers
wished to use the doctrine of self-executing treaties as a means for
accomplishing the goal of federal supremacy. Without any such evi-
dence, a logical inference that imports an entirely new doctrine into
constitutional jurisprudence simply cannot be made. Professor Vaz-
quez further claims that because they "are not cognizable in the
courts, it is often said that non-self-executing treaties do not have the
force of domestic law. ''54 Though Vazquez reserves judgment on the
merit of this assertion, he should point out that it contradicts the plain
language of the Supremacy Clause.-5 Following the plain language of
the Constitution, a self-executing treaty should have just as much
force of law as a non-self-executing treaty.
-6
The third criticism deals with the motivations of the Framers.
Even if the Framers wished to use the doctrine of self-executing trea-
ties as means of effectuating federal supremacy, there is no reason
why they would want to. There is no indication that federal
supremacy could be ensured if individuals were able to bring suit to
51. See Vazquez. supra note 3, at 698.
52. Under the Supremacy Clause, a treaty controls over conflicting state law regard-
less of whether it was enacted before or after the state law. TRIBE. supra note 50, at 226
(citing Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47 (1929)).
53. Vazquez, supra note 3, at 699 (emphasis added).
54. Id. at 702-03 (citations omitted).
55. See U.S. CoNsT. art. VI.
56. Or, at least, the Supreme Court has given no indication that a self-executing treaty
does not have as much force of law. See discussion of Kolovrat and accompanying cases,
supra notes 44-49.
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enforce treaty provisions in either state or federal courts.57 Further,
there is no indication that a treaty is "more supreme" if it is self-exe-
cuting. Nor is there any indication that allowing for individuals to
bring causes of action without enabling legislation somehow ensures
that federal law, including treaties, will be supreme over state law.
Rather than addressing this issue directly, Vazquez engages in a dis-
cussion of the purported self-executing or non-self-executing nature of
the federal courts, stressing "the lower federal courts derive their ju-
risdiction entirely from federal statutes-because, in other words, the
Article III jurisdiction of the lower federal courts is not 'self-execut-
ing'-no treaty may be enforced in these courts without some author-
izing legislation.
'5 8
However, the authorizing legislation that affords individuals the
right to enforce a treaty is not the legislation that delineates the juris-
diction of the federal district courts.5 9 Rather, "enabling legislation"
is the legislation that is passed in concurrence or subsequent to the
ratification of the treaty. As such, there is a significant difference be-
tween "enabling legislation" of a treaty, and a statute that creates the
court where one would bring the cause of action. Though some legis-
lation may be required for an individual to enforce a self-executing
treaty in a federal district court,60 that does not mean that "no law is
wholly 'self-executing."' 61 Moreover, it still sheds no light on why the
57. This is because a treaty is part of the federal law under the Supremacy Clause, and
will remain so irrespective of who happens to enforce the treaty provision. The decision of
the Framers to include treaties in the Supremacy Clause is in conformity with this notion.
58. Vazquez, supra note 3, at 699 n.20.
59. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (affording original jurisdiction to the federal district courts).
According to Vazquez, this statute would basically be the enabling legislation for the fed-
eral district courts, though no treaty was signed creating the courts. This interplay between
a potentially self-executing domestic right (eg., the Fifth Amendment), and a potentially
self-executing international treaty, is logically unsound. There are distinct differences be-
tween the international study of self-executing treaties, and the U.S. Constitutional study
of self-executing constitutional rights. These differences are significant enough to warrant
separate analysis on the part of Professor Vazquez.
60. Namely, the statute that creates the court in question. In other words, simply be-
cause a court is created by a statute, or has its own enabling legislation, it cannot follow
that any treaty enforced in that court loses its self-executing nature. Such a result would
yield the whole doctrine meaningless-a risk that is run by importing a Supremacy Clause
analysis into the determination of self-execution.
61. Vazquez, supra note 3, at 699 n.20. This does not foreclose the possibility that
there can be a non-self-executing treaty for which Congress refuses to .nact legislation.
See TRENE, supra note 50, at 226 ("[W]hether Congress can properly decline to take action
necessary to implement a non-self-executing treaty is unresolved."). Nonetheless, this
unique situation still would not implicate the Supremacy Clause, because once the validity
[Vol. 20:701
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Framers would want to use self-executing treaties to ensure federal
supremacy.
IV. Conclusion
For Professor Vazquez's analysis to be sound, three assumptions
must be made. First, despite its plain language to the contrary, one
must assume that the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution distin-
guishes between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties. Sec-
ond, one must assume that the Framers intended self-executing
treaties to be used as a means of ensuring federal supremacy. Third,
even if the Framers did intend to use self-execution as a means of
ensuring federal supremacy, one has to assume that they had a reason
to do so.
The Supremacy Clause sheds no light on the determination of
whether or not a treaty provision is self-executing. In his article, Pro-
fessor Vazquez has basically intertwined two separate and distinct ar-
eas of the law, without the proper logical or evidentiary foundation.
This practice simply does not ease the confusion surrounding the
study and identification of self-executing treaties. Unfortunately, Pro-
fessor Vazquez has added to it.
of the treaty is determined, the Supremacy Clause would presumably attach, superseding
any prior or subsequent state law.
1997]

